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The Military Dimensions 
of India’s Rise
 Iskander Rehman
Power is a notoriously elusive concept. The question of how one can defi ne, list, and identify the different facets of national power is one that has long preoccupied social scientists. 
In our rapidly changing world, which is witnessing a major diffusion in wealth from west 
to east, the question of power is accompanied by an added sense of urgency, as we seek to 
understand which states will wield true power in the emerging international system. The 
fi rst, and most immediately identifi able form of power is a nation’s military strength. The 
numbers and characteristics of infantry battalions, fl eets of vessels and columns of tanks 
seem to provide clear, straightforward, and easily quantifi able indicators of a country’s 
growing clout. This apparent simplicity, however, is highly deceptive. The study of military 
power cannot solely be based on an assessment of resources. Rather, the question is how 
a nation decides to convert those same resources into favourable outcomes, or to put it 
more bluntly, how it translates military hardware into military effectiveness, and how that 
same military effectiveness is harnessed as a means of grand strategy. To study military 
power, we therefore need to examine the interwoven human, institutional and doctrinal 
aspects which undergird the manner in which military resources are both procured and used. 
Under such conditions,  can India be characterised as a great military power? In terms of pure resources 
and sheer manpower, without a doubt. But the uneven nature of Delhi’s military modernisation, an 
apparent dearth of grand strategy, and a perennially dysfunctional state of bureaucratic paralysis cast 
serious doubts over the prospects of India’s rise as a global military power any time soon. Absent 
a genuine desire to engage in widespread organisational reform, or to profoundly recast India’s 
troubled civil-military relationship, India will remain a regional, rather than a global military power.
GLUT OF RESOURCES, LACK OF FOCUS? 
In December 2011 Foreign Policy magazine gave pride of place to ‘India’s Military Buildup’, quoting 
a recent Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) report which states that India is now 
the largest weapons importer in the world, along with studies that indicate that India may spend up to 
$80 billion on military modernisation by 2015. A number of events in recent years, including the 2009 
launch of India’s fi rst indigenously designed nuclear submarine, and a range of lucrative arms deals 
(such as the close to $20 billion deal to purchase 126 multi-role fi ghter aircraft), have captivated the 
attention of foreign observers, and led some to conclude that India is on the verge of attaining military 
superpower status. 
Indeed, India, if only in terms of sheer quantitative resources, is a great military power. With over 1.3 
million men and women in uniform, and an additional one million in reserve, the Indian Armed Forces 
constitute the third-largest volunteer war-fi ghting force in the world. The Indian Air Force has more 
than 665 combat capable aircraft in its inventory, and is actively engaged in the acquisition of several 
fourth- and fi fth-generation fi ghters. India’s Navy, often touted as a sign of India’s growing military 
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infl uence overseas, has over 40 ships and submarines 
on order, including aircraft carriers, large amphibious 
assault vessels, and nuclear submarines. India’s military 
modernisation has been fuelled by annual GDP growth 
rates oscillating in-between 7 and 9  percent over the 
past decade. 
This economic growth has meant that even though 
its share of overall GDP has stagnated, fl ickering 
in-between 2 and 3 percent, India’s defence budget 
has undergone a threefold increase in real terms, 
from $11.8 billion in 2001 to $36.3 billion for the 
current fi scal year. India’s capital expenditure, that is, 
the portion of funds devoted to the direct acquisition 
of new weapon systems, is projected to soar from 
$13.1 billion in 2010-2011 to close to $20 billion 
in 2015. Unlike during the Cold War, when India’s 
sluggish growth compelled it to rely on cheaper Soviet 
equipment in order to maintain its military deterrent, 
New Delhi now has access to a glut of resources. The 
question is whether India has the institutional and 
political capacity to mobilise those same resources 
effectively, and to modernise strategically, in response 
to clearly identifi ed challenges, rather than simply 
pursuing a smorgasbord approach to modernisation, 
bereft of any clear focus.
For the time being, India’s military modernisation 
appears somewhat uneven. Major acquisitions seem 
all too often to be driven by the quest for prestige, 
the desire for technology transfer or by deep-
seated institutional preferences. The Indian Army is 
modernising at a rapid pace in certain niche areas, 
such as missile and mechanised warfare, but the 
average jawan remains poorly equipped, armed with 
antiquated assault rifl es which frequently fail to operate 
effectively in the harsh mountainous conditions that 
characterise India’s disputed borders. The Army also 
confronts signifi cant shortfalls in its offi cer cadre, 
which is critically understaffed. The growing diffi culty 
in attracting India’s best and brightest into the military 
is a problem spread across all services, with the Indian 
Navy recently announcing a major recruitment drive. 
At an operational level, the Navy’s strongly 
carrier-centric focus has led it to systematically 
neglect anti-submarine warfare and sea denial in 
favour of sea control and soft power projection. 
This has led to certain systemic weaknesses within 
India’s blue-water fleet, which with less than 
50 percent of its small 14 boat submarine fl otilla 
deemed operational, and no towed array sonars 
currently stationed on board its surface vessels, is 
disturbingly vulnerable to submarine attacks. Similarly, 
the Indian Air Force, which has since independence 
interiorised the British Royal Air Force’s cult of the 
fi ghter pilot, tends to inordinately favour fl ight 
capabilities and air dominance over ground support 
and weapons packages. This explains, in part, the 
recent decision by the IAF to opt for the more agile 
French-designed Rafale rather than some of the more 
heavily armed and equipped fi ghters on offer.
There is therefore a danger that institutional 
preferences, deriving from India’s highly individualised 
service cultures, may come to preempt the exigencies 
of national security. In a society marked by relatively 
harmonious civil-military relations, one could argue 
that intra-service competition may paradoxically lead 
to positive outcomes. Individual services, through 
their active lobbying of the civilian leadership, infuse 
the debate with high-level military expertise, and 
generate vital information. The civilian leadership 
fi nds itself both empowered as a neutral arbiter, 
and better informed in its own decision-making. 
This is predicated, however, on the notion that the 
military leadership has unfettered access to the highest 
policymaking circles, and that the civilian leadership 
has the requisite knowledge and expertise in order 
to arbitrate effectively and clearly defi ne the nation’s 
key defense needs. Unfortunately, in India, both of 
these preconditions are conspicuous by their absence.
THE INSTITUTIONALISED IMPEDIMENTS TO 
INDIA’S MILITARY RISE
India’s dysfunctional civil-military relations form the 
cankerous root of virtually every problem affecting 
India’s military modernisation. Old Nehruvian fears of 
creeping pretorianism have led to a highly unwieldy 
and cumbersome system which has had an acutely 
deleterious effect on doctrinal and organisational 
development. Fearful of a drift towards a militaristic 
state in the vein of Pakistan, India’s post-independence 
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leaders rigorously implemented tight bureaucratic 
control of the young nation’s armed forces. 
The Raj-era post of Commander-in-Chief of the 
Indian military was abolished, and the service 
headquarters were downgraded to become attached 
offi ces, organisationally external to the MOD and 
therefore removed from major decision-making. 
Whilst it is natural that over time, concerns about the 
distribution of military power within a state become 
institutionalised, shaping the political elite’s opinions 
about military power, in India this has led to a state 
of affairs in which Indian military power is evidently 
growing, but in an organic, almost haphazard way, 
with no single agency that can oversee the process and 
plan for future contingencies. The prolonged absence 
of a Chief of Defence staff, despite a widespread 
recognition of its urgent necessity, means that the 
prime forum for inter-service discussion continues to 
be the Chief of Staff Committee (COSC), which has 
no decision-making powers and is frequently riven by 
internal squabbles. This was made painfully apparent 
during the 1999 Kargil War, where personal differences 
between the higher ranks of the Indian Army and Air 
Force were aired in public. In private, Indian offi cers, 
Source: Indian Ministry of Defense. (http://mod.nic.in/)   
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while not questioning civilian control over the military, 
bemoan the lack of effective cross-pollination of 
national security structures, and feel unheard by 
an understaffed bureaucracy which has little expertise 
or time for strategic matters. The problem seems to 
be not so much the civil-military relationship in itself 
(i.e. between the military and elected offi cials) but 
rather the extent of technocratic ossifi cation which 
has occurred over the years and which, in the view 
of the military, presents a formidable bureaucratic 
barrier dividing them from a political leadership that 
tends to focus rather narrowly on domestic, and 
electoral, issues. 
This state of affairs, naturally, impacts negatively on 
inter-service relations. While each arm of India’s military 
pays lip service to jointness as an aspirational concept, 
each service prefers to plan and train in private, rather 
than genuinely seeking operational synergy. The Army, 
in particular, which is preoccupied with maintaining its 
lion’s share of the defense budget (over 50 percent), 
demands jointness on its own terms, with the Air 
Force providing a ground support role, and the Navy 
ferrying Army troops abroad, or applying seawards 
pressure on a land-based foe.
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The likelihood of the Army agreeing to cede operational 
control of a specifi c mission to the Navy or Air Force 
appears particularly remote. The Air Force, for its 
part, hankers after air defense and air dominance, 
and harbours the fi rm conviction that the attachment 
of aircraft to ground units would be counter-productive, 
stymying the Air Force’s range and mobility, while 
reducing its numerical advantage over its Pakistani 
counterpart. Tensions still occasionally surface between 
the Navy and Air Force over the historically sensitive 
issue of maritime aviation and the Navy, which remains 
the Cinderella service with only 15 percent of the 
overall defense budget, struggles to make its case 
for the creation of a proper Marine Corps in the face 
of staunch Army opposition and political aloofness. 
Each service promulgates its own doctrine, and there 
is, as of yet, no offi cial white paper which could serve 
as a point of departure for India’s thinking in terms 
of defense.
IN SEARCH OF STRATEGY
Several observers, both in India and abroad, have 
noted that the country is in urgent need of a 
comprehensive National Strategic Review which clearly 
lays out threat assessments, while articulating India’s 
needs and priorities. India’s armed forces currently 
face a plethora of challenges, both internal and 
external. Amongst the internal challenges fi gure 
insurgencies in India’s northeastern hinterlands, a 
restive population in a heavily militarised Kashmir, 
and the slow grinding war which India’s gargantuan 
paramilitary apparatus is currently waging against 
the Naxalite movement across a large swathe of 
its territory. Externally, India is confronted with an 
unstable Pakistan, which will increasingly rely on high-
end asymmetric warfare and nuclear brinkmanship in 
order to offset India’s growing conventional superiority, 
and with a rapidly militarising China which breathes 
heavily at its door, sporadically reiterating its claims 
to tracts of Indian soil. While India’s military budget 
has grown considerably over the past ten years, 
the gulf between New Delhi and Beijing in terms 
of military funding has in fact widened, rather than 
narrowed. This resource gap is compounded by China’s 
vast strides in terms of infrastructure development 
along its side of the 4,057 km Sino-Indian border. 
This has been accomplished through the 
groundbreaking completion of the Golmud-Lhasa 
railway in 2006, which is to be extended in the course 
of the current Five Years Plan to the border towns 
of Nyingchi, Xigaze and Natung. This will push the 
Chinese railway right up to the Line of Actual Control, 
skirting both the Indian-controlled states of Sikkim and 
Arunachal Pradesh. Roads are also highly developed 
along the Chinese side of the border, which has led 
to situations of glaring disparity, in which PLA patrols 
can drive up in armoured SUVS up to the very edges of 
the contested zone while their Indian counterparts are 
forced to undergo grueling treks through hills, rivers 
and mountains, on foot or by mule train. Increasingly 
aware of the growing imbalance along the border, 
New Delhi is raising two new mountain divisions 
and planning for a new mountain strike corps. Two 
squadrons of air superiority Su-30K I fi ghters have 
been deployed at the Tezpur air base in Assam, and 
India is currently assembling battalions of scouts 
from local tribal populations in the region. The Indian 
Government also gave the go-ahead in 2010 for the 
construction of several new strategic roads in the 
Northeast. These efforts point to a more proactive 
stance towards China, and to a desire to reestablish 
greater force parity along the border. Strategic pundits 
routinely evoke the necessity for India to plan for a 
‘two-front war’, and for India to maintain a heightened 
degree of military preparedness. 
Unfortunately, there is no evidence of any serious 
tri-service planning or wargaming which could work 
towards countering India’s so-called two front threat. 
Instead, each service plans for its own contingencies 
as usual. The Indian Navy frets over the possibility of 
increased Chinese forays into the Indian Ocean, and 
particularly over what commentators have come to 
refer to as the ‘string of pearls’ – those countries in 
the Indian Ocean, as diverse as Pakistan, Myanmar and 
Sri Lanka, in which China has attempted to establish 
‘nodes of infl uence’ by means of enhanced economic 
and security ties. In some cases this has led to joint 
port construction or enlargement deals, such as with 
Pakistan at Gwadar, and with Sri Lanka at Hambantota. 
For the time being, however, none of these ports 
have yet taken on an overt military role, and 
most informed analysts concur that now, at least, 
China’s string of pearls strategy is more economic 
than militaristic in nature.
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Several, more immediate threats are emerging in the Indian Ocean. One is the proliferation of anti-access 
weapons, which threaten to constrict the Indian Navy’s freedom of maneuver, whether it be via vaulting 
China’s precision-strike systems, placed in places such as Tibet or Yunnan, from land to sea; or through 
Pakistan’s use of submarines and anti-ship missiles as cost-effective force multipliers against India’s larger, 
but increasingly vulnerable, fl eet. As Sino-Pakistani naval cooperation gains impetus, the extension of India’s 
two-front threat from land to sea is a destabilising evolution which Indian armed forces will be compelled 
to confront through Air Force/Navy jointness sooner or later. Another destabilising trend lies in the nuclear 
realm, where both Beijing and Islamabad have been actively modernising, and in Pakistan’s case, enlarging 
their arsenals. India’s pursuit of a Ballistic Missile Defense System and both nations’ fl irtation with dual-use 
delivery systems at sea risks severely undermining crisis stability. The nuclearisation of Pakistan’s fl eet is another 
strategic wild card, which will most likely occur in the course of the upcoming decade, and which needs to 
be integrated into New Delhi’s operational planning.
Unfortunately, India’s security priorities are still largely defi ned by the more static contingencies imposed by 
territorial defense, as well as by the Indian Army’s struggle to determine how it can successfully fulfi ll wartime 
objectives without crossing one of Pakistan’s ever-shifting nuclear thresholds. The Air Force, for its part, places 
a great emphasis on cross-border strikes and air defense, and appears reluctant to join hands with the Navy 
in order to fully exploit the nation’s considerable potential in terms of maritime airpower. 
DOMESTIC CONSTRAINTS, GLOBAL ASPIRATIONS: THE UNCERTAINTIES OF INDIA’S MILITARY RISE
India’s military modernisation finds itself at a critical juncture. New Delhi faces numerous 
external and internal challenges, which cannot be merely addressed by the continuous provision 
of resources devoid of any form of strategic direction. In order to fulfi ll its global aspirations and unmoor itself 
from its subcontinental tethers, India will need to engage in a transformational overhaul of its institutions and 
procedures. A loosening of bureaucratic control over the armed forces would give birth to a more functional 
civil-military relationship and foster greater tri-service synchrony, both in terms of warfi ghting and procurement. 
The nation’s convoluted defense acquisition process, which rigorously promotes autarky by requiring foreign 
defense fi rms to source over 30 percent of their products from India, hampers India’s acquisition of much 
needed advanced equipment, is also in urgent need of reform. Finally, greater competence is required at the 
Ministry of Defense, which has traditionally been plagued by corruption and bureaucratic sloth. In a depressing 
display of ineffi ciency, a combined $5.5 billion worth of procurement funds were returned, unspent, to the 
Ministry of Defence’s treasury, from 2002 to 2008. At a time when certain sectors of India’s armed forces are 
in desperate need of new equipment, such malpractice will become increasingly intolerable.
Rapid evolutions in the region’s strategic environment will also undoubtedly prompt changes in the composition 
of India’s armed forces, with a gradual rebalancing in favour of the historically underprivileged Air Force and 
Navy, and a slow dilution of the weight of the Army. If India wishes to become a great military power, it will 
need to break out of its continental shackles and take on the trappings of a truly oceanic power. Only once 
it has acquired an expeditionary capability will it be able to emerge as a net security provider in the Indian 
Ocean and beyond. For the time being, the Indian Navy has been at the vanguard of this effort, aiding in 
numerous humanitarian or custodial operations, but the military still lacks the ability to project power into 
heavily contested environments far from its shores. Until that day, the greatest challenges India will ever have 
to face on the road towards military great power status lie within – not without. ■
